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Center for European Studies 
New York University Abstract 
The European public’s identification with Europe, or more specifically, the 
European Union, is necessary for furthering both legitimacy of EU institutions and 
integration of the political and social sectors.  Their support for and perceived benefits 
from the EU do strongly correlate with their identification, but this fails to answer the 
larger question of why.  Any European identity requires mass support, which can be 
fostered with by the EU with the help of the member states.  While initiatives like the 
single currency and SOCRATES are indeed useful, they will be negated if national 
identification-inducing factors are stronger.  It is possible, and even desirable, for the two 
levels to work together to enhance this European identification, through avenues like the 
creation of trans-European political parties and mass media.  However, the likelihood that 
a widespread European identity will form is small, because of the vastly diverse histories 
and structures of the member states and the identities of their citizens. 
  2Introduction 
In 2004, 56 percent of residents in Europe identified themselves, to some extent, 
as “European.”  Of those surveyed, six percent considered themselves to feel European 
first, and secondly, their own nationality; four percent considered themselves exclusively 
European.
1  While at first glance the latter two numbers may not be staggeringly high, 
they represent a departure from the traditional identification to the nation-state.  In this 
paper, identifying with “Europe” is used to mean identifying with the European Union, 
though the varied meanings of the word are discussed below.  Also, the phrases 
“identifying with Europe” and “feeling European” are used interchangeably throughout 
the paper. 
After the legal unification of Italy in 1860, Massimo D’Azeglio announced that, 
“having made Italy, we must now make Italians.”
2  This is not unlike the sentiment of the 
European elite today, which, having “made Europe,” must now focus on “making 
Europeans.”  The founders of the EU were driven by the desire to foster a European 
identity “that would overarch and thereby temper contending nationalisms,” a European 
identity which would coexist with nationalism.
3  Nationalism, as defined by Ernest 
Gellner, “holds that the political and national unit should be congruent; it is a theory of 
political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political 
ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the 
power-holders from the rest.”
4  
Despite these intentions, the dismantling of barriers to the free movement of 
goods, capital and people took priority until about fifteen years ago, when officials 
realized that integration did not guarantee a cultural spillover.
5  European identity has 
moved from a possible outcome of integration to a force determining the level of future 
integration, because without some identification with Europe on the part of the citizens, 
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  3the political actors will not move forward.
6  The founders, in their plans to foster 
Europeanism, were able to appeal to elites who would agree with collective decision-
making at a supranational level.  The transformation and politicization of the EU over 
time has taken that “luxury” from officials and forced them to enhance the attachment of 
the mass public to the EU.
7
Identification with Europe has significant implications.  First, it fosters the 
legitimacy of European institutions as seen by the public, needed to combat the oft-cited 
democratic deficit.  Legitimate political power is “acquired and exercised according to 
established rules, which are justifiable according to accepted beliefs,” including the 
“rightful source of authority, the proper ends and standards of government and 
recognition from other legitimate authorities.”
8  According to Rousseau, citizens give 
legitimacy to a political community through a social contract, which is “maintained 
implicitly legitimate because citizens choose to identify themselves to their community.”
9
Second, Europe’s identity has “come to the fore in recent years because it is being 
seen as a parallel development to the construction of a European Union,” particularly in 
its relation to national identity.
10  National-level representatives are unlikely to forge 
ahead with political and social integration if their constituents are not in favor.  Support 
for such integration will require the feeling of “Europeanness” throughout Europe, and 
probably at higher than the current 56-percent level.  Legitimacy and integration are 
highly intertwined, as the issue of legitimacy is “by far the greatest obstacle to European 
integration today.”
11  The European Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers and 
other supranational institutions depend upon authority and credibility to support “their 
claim to represent the ‘European interest’ over and above that of the individual member 
states.”  This claim “presupposes a transnational European public whose ‘general will’ 
arises from common interests that can be represented and championed by these 
supranational bodies.”
12
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  4The existing research is inadequate in two ways.  Most significantly, studies on 
the effects of variables at both the European and national levels are scarce, particularly 
quantitative studies.  The majority of the debate is structured around whether or not there 
is a European identity.  However, it is clear that a proportion of the European public 
identifies itself either primarily or exclusively with Europe.  It is counter-productive to 
argue over the existence of such an identity, rather than explore its creation and 
components.  To follow this, the few studies that do exist are at least a decade old, and 
are narrow in scope and sample size.
13  The geopolitical changes of the 1990s have made 
a more current evaluation essential.  Thus, to conduct a study based on a broad survey – 
the Eurobarometer – and quantitatively analyzed at a European-wide level, and ultimately 
qualitatively dissected at the national level, is to offer a timely and useful contribution to 
the existing work. 
It is first necessary to discuss various theories about identity and the formation 
thereof, followed by a more specific review of the European myth and the idea of Europe.  
Next, thirteen hypotheses about factors which may affect European identity are 
explained, as well as the data and methodology of the study.  The results of the fifteen-
country analysis are outlined, with three country case studies and trans-European trends 
explored.  Finally, the steps taken by the EU during the past fifty years are examined. 
 
Theories about Identity 
Identities are “the product of collective social fabrication over time… forged from 
traditions and aspirations as well as from exchange and reciprocity.”
14  They require 
“recognition of and participation in a web of social relations or communities that envelop 
the self through which individuals feel themselves to be identical with others.”
15  An 
individual’s political identity is “based on perceptions that are [not] rooted in nature, but 
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  5are instead the result of ‘nurture.’”
16  Our very “social existence requires an identity 
embedded in an institution,” such as the state, or in this case, the European Union.
17  
Individual identity is often situational; for example, one might consider himself 
Viennese, Austrian or European, depending on the context.  Identity is based upon a 
sense of distinctiveness from other groups in society and it requires the definition of an 
‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group.’
18   
There are two main components of all political identities: civic and cultural.   
Civic identity relates to political structures and the “set of institutions, rights and rules 
that preside over the political life of a community.”
19  In contrast, cultural identity relates 
to the sense of belonging to a particular group, defined by ethnic, cultural or other social 
similarities.
20  The “liberal-political” theorists say the former may be built by elites who 
can create supranational structures similar to those at the national level.
21  T h e  
“romantic” theorists reject this and insist an “organic ‘people’ must exist in order to be 
legitimately represented by an elite.”
22  Civic identity involves a “group of individuals 
rationally united within shared structures of citizenship,” much like the aspects of the 
European citizenship enshrined in the Treaty on European Union.
23  The steps toward a 
European citizenship take root, particularly, in the free movement of persons throughout 
the member states of the EU.  Because of this, Mayer and Palmowski call European 
citizenship the “sine qua non for a meaningful European identity,” and say it has 
“severely limited… the exclusivity of nationality.”
24
New political systems have for centuries been very aware of the necessity of 
generating a mass political identity to establish legitimacy.  States that have failed to 
create this identity have “often experienced massive problems of a lack of civic cohesion 
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  6and exclusion.”
25  History is a key ingredient in the creation of an identity.  It helps form 
an individual’s conception of himself as a member of the community, and “how people 
experience the past is intrinsic to their perception of the present.”
26  The dilemma 
associated with forming and promoting this history is discussed below. 
 
The European Myth 
According to Ernest Gellner, the formation of nationalism requires deliberate 
maneuvers to create a common feeling.  It is not an “awakening of nation-states to self-
consciousness; it invents them where previously they did not exist.”
27  Creating a 
European identity is much like creating a national identity, though, as outlined below, 
somewhat more difficult.  The touted idea of “Europeanness” is a “collective identity that 
can transcend exclusively parochial and nationalistic loyalties and lay the foundations for 
a higher level of consciousness based on allegiance to European, rather than national, 
institutions and ideals.”
28
The 1957 Treaty of Rome has as a goal the “ever closer Union among the peoples 
of Europe,” a goal echoed in many later documents.
29  The inherent problem is that 
“Europe” is never defined; this definition is highly political, because depending on who is 
asked and at what time he is asked, the answers will be entirely different.  Since the 
founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, two theories of integration have 
been touted.  The first, intergovernmentalism, posits that the formation of European 
identity conflicts with existing national identities, yet never reaches the same status as 
national identity because it is without the rooted symbols and myths.  In contrast, 
neofunctionalism argues that loyalties will gradually be transferred to the European level.  
This theory is based upon the assumption that national identities are not as deeply rooted 
as intergovernmentalists argue.
30
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  7The long-standing assumption about the relation between national and European 
identity was that they were mutually exclusive, and that strong nationalism prevented 
continued European integration.
31  Through quantitative analysis, Hooghe and Marks 
show that someone with a relatively high attachment to one community (be it local, 
regional, national, or European) is likely to have such an attachment to other 
communities.
32  This contradicted the theory that an individual with a high level of 
attachment to their nation would, as a result, have a much lower level of attachment to 
Europe.  National, supranational and sub-national identities can and do overlap.   
  Theories of multiple identities have two main models: the ‘nested’ model and the 
‘marble cake’ model.  The first implies a series of concentric circles, or nesting dolls, 
with one identity inside the next.
33  In this instance, local identities would be inside 
regional, inside national, inside supranational.  The second suggests the many 
components of individual identity are mixed together and are interdependent.
34  As such, 
the same identity, be it ‘German’ or ‘Welsh,’ can mean very different things to everyone 
who holds it, based on the way his identities play off one another.  Such is the case with 
Europeanness. 
The European version of cultural identity would be in reference to the European 
continent or a European civilization.  The EU is representative of the European civic 
identity.
35  Increasing the feeling of Europeanness requires fostering the “perception of 
the salience of Europe as an area of civic unity,” as focus group studies have regularly 
shown a majority articulating a predominantly civic view of Europe.
36  Essentially, most 
Europeans think “Europe” means “the European Union,” rather than making the leap 
between “Europe” and “a European demos.” 
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  8There are two major impediments to the formation of a European history or myth: 
the varied meanings of “Europe” and the unclear delimitation of its borders.  The 
meaning and borders of “Europe” change depending on the context, be it cultural, 
political or economic.  In his work on nations and nationalism, Benedict Anderson labels 
nations as “imagined political communities,” because even in tinier nations like 
Luxembourg, it is highly unlikely that members will ever know most of their fellow 
members, yet they believe in a common identity.
37  This imagined community becomes 
real when its members share values and a sense of a common history and common 
external boundaries.  While the EU and a sense of Europe is real and very present for 
Europe’s elites, this is not the case for most of the public at large.
38
Some scholars argue that there are distinct European characteristics upon which a 
common identity can be built, while others argue that no such basis exists.  Elements 
present in nation-building – common language, educational systems, a society with 
citizenship rights – are either in the midst of being created or will be impossible to 
create.
39  Furthermore, characteristics crucial to building national identity are often the 
ones that divide Europeans, rather than bringing them together.  Smith asks if “Europe” is 
just the sum total of its national communities and identities, or if it is something more.  If 
the latter is true, he asks what qualities distinguish Europe from anything else, things 
which can be called specifically ‘European experiences.’
40   
Neither Europe nor the European Union have a “founding moment to define a 
common, positive and transcendent ideal of what the [EU] was about, and what it 
differentiated itself from,” which, as discussed in the previous section, is an essential 
component of identity formation.
41  One of the largest, if not the largest, stumbling 
blocks on the road to any European identity is the lack of a common language.  This 
hinders the everyday business of the EU as well as the identification of the public with 
the elites and with each other.
42  Without a common language, the possibility of a 
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  9common culture is very unlikely, as language is the “central medium of cultural 
identity.”
43   
 
Factors Affecting Identity 
  Thirteen hypotheses are proposed for two sets of regressions: one for variables 
over which the EU has control and one for variables outside of the EU realm of power. 
Hypothesis 1: People in countries that have been members of the EU for longer 
periods of time will feel more European. 
  Countries, at the time they joined the Union, had publics which were supportive 
of, or at the least, permissive toward integration.  This support allowed elites in these 
countries to push forward with the process.
44  In a study about support for integration, 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler found that regardless of the timing of a country’s entry into 
the European Union, support increased over time.
45  Their theory was twofold: elites 
educate the public about membership benefits and the public becomes increasingly 
familiar with the institutions and rules of the EU.
46  
Hypothesis 2: People from countries with federal systems of government will feel 
more European.
47
Identification and attachment in federal systems are often divided among the 
national and regional levels, with regional attachment being relatively high.
48  These 
states are “used to sharing sovereignty among the various levels of territorial 
governance,” and as a result, their publics may more readily form an identity with a 
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  10supranational layer of governance.
49  While in countries like Spain and the United 
Kingdom, devolution to varying extents has occurred, it differs from a formal federal 
system because these partially autonomous regions do not have the same ability to be 
represented at the European level.  To operate at the European level is to symbolically 
appear as more than a region at home, which, “above all, explains the strong pro-
Europeanism of most minority nationalists in the European Union.”
50  Identification with 
Europe will likely be higher in these devolved regions, but depending on the size of the 
region compared to the rest of the country, it may not be enough to have an effect on the 
overall level of identification.  
Hypothesis 3: People from countries with more open citizenship policies will feel 
more European. 
Citizenship is the final stage in a successful immigration policy.  However, while 
economic factors primarily drive immigration policies, naturalization policies are almost 
entirely political.  They require the “integration of strangers and the acceptance of 
different cultures and races,” as each state thereby “gives its stamp of inclusion to each 
person accepted into the nation-state’s inner circle of citizens.”
51  The combination of 
emigration, declining birth rates and rising immigration numbers in Europe present a 
crisis of identity for many Europeans.  Nationalism may rise and a large portion of the 
citizenry may view “immigrants as the final insult to national identity.”
52  
Hypothesis 4: People from countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will 
feel more European. 
Though it was assumed wealthier individuals would identify more strongly with 
their nation, recent studies have disproved this theory.  Shulman proposes that national 
identity “can serve as an equalizer in the face of clear disparities between economic 
achievement and status,” thus making the common myths shared by citizens of the same 
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  11nation more relevant than their socio-economic status.
53  As a result, the economic status 
of a nation as a whole is more important when looking at identification than is the wealth 
of the individuals therein.  Scholars largely agree that economic success and memories of 
such success can foster development of national identity.
54  With the introduction and 
success of the Euro, similar reasoning suggests that individuals across Europe may feel a 
common bond over their economies.  However, citizens in countries outside the Euro-
zone are not excluded from the GDP-European identity link, as the spread of global 
economies can undermine the nation-state by making one’s prosperity increasingly more 
reliant upon transnational factors.
55   
Hypothesis 5: People from countries with higher unemployment levels will feel 
more European. 
  In addition to the above-mentioned international economic interdependency, the 
nations of Europe have been threatened by sluggish growth, large deficits and high 
unemployment since the late 1980s.
56  As a result, scholars theorize that citizens have 
begun to look to Europe and the EU to provide them with greater wealth and job 
opportunities.  Additionally, some claim that the regions with the highest unemployment 
rates often benefit from the largest amounts of regional aid, which is directly associated 
with the EU as an institution, possibly increasing their support for and identification with 
Europe.
57
Hypothesis 6: People from countries with more politically centrist governments 
will feel more European. 
The alignment of a government on the political spectrum is a key element in 
determining policy, because the beliefs and values of the leaders in office will guide the 
course of their administration’s policies.  Anti-EU rhetoric can be found on both ends of 
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  12the left-right political spectrum.  Some on the left feel the EU does not go far enough in 
supporting social welfare policies and fostering identity, as some on the right think there 
has been too much compromising over national policies and identity.  Across Europe, the 
parties generally most in favor of integration are Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, 
regionalists, and liberal.  The parties most strongly opposed to integration are usually 
extreme left, green and agrarian and extreme right.
58  As a result, the more centrist the 
government, the more likely they are to be pro-European, which can both reflect and 
shape public opinion. 
Hypothesis 7: People from countries with less support for extremist, anti-
immigration parties will feel more European. 
Continuing from the idea of citizenship and openness toward immigrants, the 
increasing influx over the past decades has created a “reactive, xenophobic kind of 
nationalism,” through which these culturally different individuals are perceived by the 
“indigenous population as a potential or an actual threat to national identity.”
59  The 
extreme right parties are considered highly nationalistic.  Their post-war focus has been 
protecting the nation from outsiders, and they play on fears of a loss of tradition and of 
being challenged for limited employment opportunities.  Since the 1980s, extremist 
parties have broken through in many legislative elections throughout Western Europe, 
and in some cases, joined governing coalitions. 
Hypothesis 8: People from countries with larger lengths of borders shared with 
other EU member states will feel more European. 
The twentieth century saw a world predominantly divided into bordered nation-
states, economies and societies
60 Borders provide a basis for identity because of their 
symbolic importance.  They imply sameness with the inside and difference from the 
outside.  Through the years of integration across Western Europe, the state borders no 
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  13longer shut off individual states from one another, but encompass many interdependent 
European Union member states.  Continued interaction with bordering countries can 
contribute to a feeling of commonality.  This “we-feeling” is increased when political or 
economic cooperation is involved.
61  
Hypothesis 9: People from countries with greater support for the Euro will feel 
more European. 
Twelve of the current twenty-five EU member states use the Euro as their 
currency, and have done so exclusively since 2002.  A “large majority” of their citizens 
say they feel more European than they did when using just their national currencies.
62  
Coins and banknotes are, through their daily usage in nearly everyone’s life, among the 
most important methods of fostering identity.  The symbols on them are carefully chosen 
to represent historical symbols of the common national myth.  In the case of the Euro, the 
non-descript architectural images do not call any recognizable national figure or 
landmark to mind, and only the backs of the coins are personalized with a symbol from 
one of the Euro-zone countries.  The Eurobarometer surveys ask individuals whether they 
are “for” or “against” the Euro, regardless of whether or not their country has adopted the 
single currency. 
Hypothesis 10: People from countries holding the Council presidency will feel 
more European. 
The presidency of the Council of Ministers is a six-month, rotating position: 
January-June and July-December.  The duties of the country holding the presidency, with 
the head of government at the helm, include arranging and chairing most Council 
meetings, gathering support for initiatives and ensuring some consistency between its 
term and those of the other ‘troika’ members.
63  There are several advantages to holding 
the Presidency.  Aside from an increasing ability to help shape and set the EU policy 
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  14priorities, the country finds itself with more international prestige.  The head of 
government and top ministers meet with international dignitaries and statesmen on behalf 
of the EU, to media fanfare and interest.  The citizens of the country holding the 
presidency are likely to be more aware of EU initiatives headed by their national 
leadership. 
Hypothesis 11: People from countries participating in the Schengen Agreements 
will feel more European. 
The “boundaries of inclusion no longer end at national borders”
64: the Schengen 
acquis is now a part of the European Union framework, though not all EU countries have 
adopted its policies and not all countries that have adopted its policies are members of the 
EU.  From its entry into force in 1995, it “abolished the internal borders of the signatory 
states and created a single external border where immigration checks for the Schengen 
area are carried out in accordance with a single set of rules.”
65  In addition to the removal 
of internal border checks between signatory states, the rules for asylum and visa 
acquisition were harmonized and the Schengen Information System was established to 
share judicial and criminal information.  Because citizens of signatory countries may 
travel freely between other ‘Schengenland’ states, they may, as a result, feel more 
European. 
Hypothesis 12: People from countries with larger percentages of higher education 
students from other EU countries will feel more European. 
The exchange of students in tertiary education across Europe can “make a major 
contribution to a European identity where national specificities are valued, rather than 
being suppressed.”
66  The Commission aimed to add a European dimension to all levels 
of education through programs for educational exchanges (SOCRATES.)  It was hoped 
that these would increase European consciousness among the participants and those 
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  15around them, just as education helped create national consciousness.  The mobilizing of 
memory and history is central to this process.
67  The public in countries which receive 
higher levels of higher education students from other European Union countries are thus 
likely to feel more European as a result of their exposure to these students, as well as the 
aspects of culture brought back by their own students from abroad. 
Hypothesis 13: People from countries with higher voter turnout for European 
Parliament elections will feel more European. 
Studies have shown that individuals who are more active regarding the EU – 
voting in European elections, having greater knowledge of the EU political happenings – 
usually identify with Europe more than those who do not.  Hooghe and Marks suggest 
that the “quality of participation” may affect the development of identity.
68  A person’s 
participation in elections and other public affairs “presupposes the recognition of actors 
as relevant, autonomous and self-determined,” which indicates that those who vote in 
European Parliament elections accord the EU and its institutions legitimacy.
69  
 
Support versus Identification 
Identification with Europe and support for the EU are two ideas often confused, 
and some suggest, “that the latter is only another expression of the former.”
70  This, 
however, is flawed.  As discussed above, the word “Europe” can and does mean many 
different things.  While this study uses “Europe” to mean the EU for the sake of 
evaluating effectiveness of EU initiatives, not all survey participants will have made the 
same linkage.  Also, the relationship is somewhat cyclical: “does strong identification 
with Europe lead to support for integration and EU institutions, or does involvement and 
interaction with EU institutions lead to stronger identification with Europe?”
71  
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  16Similarly, the amount of people believing they have benefited from EU 
membership does not equal the amount of support for EU integration or the level of 
identification with Europe.  It is not unfeasible that someone may have benefited from 
existing EU policies, yet be against continued integration, both of which – or neither of 
which – could affect how European he does or does not feel.  For example, farmers 
benefit more than almost any other professional group in the EU, by way of the CAP, yet 
“there is no indication that they identify with the EU to any considerable degree.”
72  
It is not enough to say “he supports the EU, so he feels European,” or, “she does 
not think she has benefited from the EU, so she does not identify with Europe,” because 
neither statement answers the crucial question of why this is so.  Despite all this, it is 
probable that all three are strongly positively correlated, and that they will, in some 
capacity, affect European identification.  This theory is tested and explained in the 
Results and Analysis section below. 
 
Data and Methodology 
The dependent variables come from the annual Eurobarometer studies carried out 
by the European Commission.  The data set includes information for fifteen EU member 
states for the years 1992-2003:
73
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
  There are five dependent variables: the percentage of citizens surveyed who 
identify only with their nationality, first with their nationality and secondly with Europe, 
first with Europe and secondly with their nationality, only with Europe, and with both 
their nationality and Europe, in either order.  The independent variables are divided into 
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  17two categories, those that are part of EU initiatives to foster European identity, and those 
that are outside the realm of EU policy or are associated with feelings of nationalism.
74   
  To determine the level of support for the extremist right-wing parties in a country, 
the percentage of votes in national parliamentary elections for such parties was tallied, 
with data from the EJPR.  The possible problem with such a method is that there are a 
variety of electoral systems in place in Europe, and a high level of support for a particular 
party may be indicative of the electoral system and could overestimate – or actually 
underestimate – the degree of support for the nationalist party.
75  These discrepancies, 
however, are unlikely to pose a problem for several reasons.  First, nearly all of the 
countries in the study have proportional representation systems, making the comparisons 
more accurate.  Secondly, because of the large number of political parties comprising 
legislatures in Europe, it is less likely that support for extremist parties can be seen as 
protest votes, or disenchantment with the two main parties. 
  The government ideology variable is based upon data from the EJPR and a 
method devised by Michael Laver and Ian Budge, expanded upon by Richard Fording 
and HeeMin Kim.  Many elements of parties’ manifestos are analyzed and classified, on a 
scale of 0-100 (with zero as the most right-wing and 100 as the most left-wing), 
according to their stance on issues like welfare systems and increased European 
cooperation and integration.  This is considered the most accurate method for cross-
country comparison.  As Andrea Volkens says, “because the programmes are usually 
ratified by party conventions, they are authoritative statements of party policies and 
represent the whole party, not just one faction or politician.  In addition, election 
programmes are published before every election.  Thus, ideological movements of parties 
can be studied over time.”
76
  Kim and Fording have classified the manifestos of European political parties in 
seventeen western European countries through the 1999 election cycle.  They devised a 
method to compute the ideology of a government, but had only done so through 1995, 
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  18and not for each of the fifteen countries.  To obtain the most consistent measures of 
ideology, their party ideology data and data on cabinet compositions from the European 
Journal of Political Research was used to obtain the measure of overall government 
ideology, based on the equation: 
(ideology of party A)(% of cabinet posts of party A) + (ideology of party B)(% of cabinet posts of 
party B) + ...  + (ideology of party Z)(% of cabinet posts of party Z) 
 
Results and Analysis 
The first through eight hypotheses above deal with variables that are either 
outside the realm of the EU or increase feeling of nationalism, or both (see Table 1).  The 
F-tests strongly rejected the null hypothesis that the independent variables had no effect 
on identification with Europe.  The length of time of a country’s membership in the EU 
had significant coefficients at a 5% or better level and shows that the longer a country has 
been in the EU, the likely its public is to feel European.  This supports Hypothesis 1.  The 
federal structure of a country had a mostly significant effect, though correlation was 
mixed, meaning a federal system has both positive and negative effects on identity.  This 
is contrary to Hypothesis 2.  One possible explanation for the negative effect is that 
attachments are often “highest among contiguous territorial units,” meaning that the 
“strongest associations for any territorial level are those with the next level up or down,” 
such as from local to regional, regional to national, national to European, or the reverse.
77
The citizenship score of a country, outlined in Hypothesis 3, had a somewhat 
significant effect on European identity, with the significant regressions suggesting a 
negative correlation between it and feeling European; countries with more open 
citizenship policies were less likely to feel European, contrary to the hypothesis.  This 
could be a result of citizens feeling their country being “invaded” by outsiders and, to 
protect their sense of identity, they increase their nationalist sentiments and hold more 
exclusively national identification. 
Per-capita GDP had a moderately significant effect, with higher-GDP countries 
feeling more European, supporting Hypothesis 4.  Countries with higher unemployment 
rates had a significant positive correlation to feeling more European and less exclusively 
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  19national, supporting Hypothesis 5.  The government ideology variable was mostly 
insignificant, yet the sets significant at the 5% or better level show a mixed correlation, 
supporting Hypothesis 6.  Lower levels of votes for extremist parties were correlated with 
greater feelings of nationalism, and vice-versa, contrary to Hypothesis 7.  A reason for 
this could be that though extremist right-wing parties received support in almost all 
countries, only in cases like the 2000 Austrian elections did politicians from these parties 
form part of a coalition government.  A greater number of border area shared with fellow 
EU member states was positively correlated with a greater identification with Europe and 
was moderately significant, supporting Hypothesis 8. 
Table 1: Effects of national issues on identity 
Independent Variable     
Dependent 
Variable    
       
  National  N & E  E & N  European  Both E & N 
Years  of  Membership  -0.467**  0.265** 0.114** 0.073** 0.380** 
  (0.061) (0.046) (0.013) (0.019) (0.051) 
Federal System  5.029*  -7.687**  1.262**  0.267  -6.514** 
  (2.072) (1.538) (0.445) (0.626) (1.721) 
Citizenship  score  0.108 -0.162**  -0.001  0.019 -0.164** 
  (0.058) (0.043) (0.012) (0.017) (0.048) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.000**  -0.000  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.659**  0.300  0.116* 0.165* 0.415* 
  (0.250) (0.185) (0.054) (0.076) (0.208) 
Government  Ideology  -0.098  0.048 0.004 0.037*  0.051 
  (0.052) (0.038) (0.011) (0.016) (0.043) 
Right-wing Votes  -0.328**  0.368**  0.004  -0.005  0.373** 
  (0.089) (0.066) (0.019) (0.027) (0.074) 
Border  size  -0.001 0.002* 0.000  -0.001 0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant  70.243** 37.619** -1.631  -5.941** 36.110** 
  (4.705) (3.491) (1.011) (1.421) (3.907) 












  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses.  Pr. = probability.  ** significant at 1% level in two-tailed test; * 
significant at 5% level in two-tailed test 
Hypotheses 9-13 involve variables related to EU initiatives for fostering European 
identity (see Tables 2 and 3).
78  Supporting Hypothesis 9, the level of support for the 
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  20Euro in a country was strongly positively correlated to the identification of citizens with 
Europe. Holding of the Council presidency was not significant at a five-percent or better 
level, yet the results show a positive correlation with feeling European, supporting 
Hypothesis 10.  However, being a signatory of the Schengen Agreements did have an 
overwhelmingly significant effect on European identity, with the public in signatory 
countries feeling less exclusively national and more European, supporting Hypothesis 11. 
Table 2: Effects of EU initiatives on identity 
Independent Variable     
Dependent 
Variable    
       
  National  N & E  E & N  European  Both E & N 
Euro support  -0.364**  0.298**  0.040*  0.013  0.340** 
  (0.064) (0.047) (0.018) (0.015) (0.054) 
Council  Presidency  -1.971  0.531 0.042 0.360 0.610 
  (2.708) (1.986) (0.757) (0.630) (2.292) 
Schengen member  -10.939**  9.176**  1.788*  0.668  10.916** 
  (2.773) (2.034) (0.774) (0.646) (2.347) 
Foreign  students  -0.164**  -0.109* 0.081** 0.164** -0.028 
  (0.058) (0.043) (0.016) (0.014) (0.049) 
Constant  78.139** 17.920** 1.401  0.858  19.224** 
  (4.155) (3.047) (1.161) (0.967) (3.516) 
       
F-test  F(4,84) = 23.53  F(4,84) = 19.97  F(4,84) = 13.66  F(4,84) = 45.87  F(4,84) = 21.35 
  Pr. =  0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses.  Pr. = probability.  ** significant at 1% level in two-tailed test; * 
significant at 5% level in two-tailed test 
The percentage of foreign students (from other EU countries) in a country’s 
higher education system had a largely significant but somewhat mixed correlation with 
European identity.  The public in countries with larger percentages of these students was 
most likely to feel less exclusively national and more European, supporting Hypothesis 
12, though some negative correlations were present. The level of voter turnout for 
European Parliament elections had a moderately significant effect on European identity 
(see Table 3.)  Higher levels of turnout were positively correlated with feeling European, 
to some extent, and feeling less exclusively national, supporting Hypothesis 13. 
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  21Table 3: Effects of turnout for European Parliament elections on identity 
Independent Variable     
Dependent 
Variable    
       
  National  N & E  E & N  European  Both E & N 
EP Voter Turnout  -0.378**  0.138  0.099**  0.112**  0.237** 
  (0.116) (0.077) (0.030) (0.034) (0.090) 
Constant  64.229** 34.824** 1.070  -1.543  35.894** 
  (6.805) (4.519) (1.792) (2.016) (5.271) 
       
F-test  F(1,28) = 10.71  F(1,28) = 3.23  F(1,28) = 10.52  F(1,28) = 10.60  F(1,28) = 6.98 
  Pr. = 0.003  Pr. = 0.083  Pr. = 0.003  Pr. = 0.003  Pr. = 0.013 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses.  Pr. = probability.  ** significant at 1% level in two-tailed test; * 
significant at 5% level in two-tailed test 
Finally, to address the claims made above in the Support versus Identity section, it 
is clear that people who support the EU and perceive greater benefits from it are more 
likely to feel European to some extent (see Table 4).  These variables were negatively 
correlated with exclusive national identification and positively correlated with the other 
four dependent variables.  Both support for and benefits from the EU had significant 
coefficients at a 5% or better level.  The F-tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that the 
independent variables have no effect on identification, with the exception of the few 
cases where the results were not statistically significant.  This supports the claim that 
support for and perceived benefits from the European Union do affect levels of 
identification, yet are not synonymous terms. 
Table 4: Effects of ‘support for’ and ‘benefit from the EU’ on identity 
Independent Variable     
Dependent 
Variable    
         
  National  N & E  E & N  European  Both E & N 
Support for EU  -0.884**  0.391**  0.188**  0.188**  0.580** 
  (0.105) (0.081) (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.092) 
Benefit from EU  0.582**  -0.190**  -0.146**  -0.142**  -0.336** 
  (0.091) (0.071) (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.080) 
Constant  61.506** 32.146** 3.510**  1.052  35.592** 
  (3.112) (2.412) (0.879)  (0.941)  (2.727) 












  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000  Pr. = 0.000 
Notes: Standard error in parentheses.  Pr. = probability.  ** significant at 1% level in two-tailed test; * 
significant at 5% level in two-tailed test 
  22Taken as a whole, these hypotheses do advance our understanding of why one 
individual may feel more European than another from a different country or another from 
their own local area.  While they are very useful, they do not show a complete picture.  
Once general pan-European trends are known, it is essential to then look at each country 
more in-depth to establish the nuances that play into their citizens’ identifications with 
Europe.  Three of the fifteen countries – chosen for their varied times of entry, locations 
within Europe, size, structure, importance within the EU, distinct national situations and 
level of overall identification with Europe – are explored below and presented 
alphabetically. 
 
Case Study: Denmark 
Danish politicians are faced with balancing their country’s dependence on Europe 
and a citizenry largely skeptical about supranational integration.  The low levels of 
European identification on the part of the Danes stem from three main sources: the 
unique small-state position of Denmark within the European Union, the presence of 
alternative options to European integration – unlikely as they now appear to be – and the 
mostly homogenous population. 
The geographic position of Denmark and its close ties – to the Nordic countries, 
to the UK and also to the United States – have led to a long history during which options 
other than EU membership were at least perceived.  The European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA) membership was never fully satisfying for Denmark, as it neither had a common 
policy for agriculture nor considered free trade in agriculture to be a goal.  Furthermore, 
agricultural exports were, until the 1960s, more valuable to Denmark than industrial 
exports and the British market was the primary destination for Danish agricultural 
exports.
79  It was tolerable for the Danish to have one of their two major trading partners 
– West Germany – on the other side of the fence, as an EEC member, but it was not 
feasible to have both West Germany and the UK as members while remaining outside.    
Denmark’s stated desire was to build a bridge between the EEC and Norden and leading 
politicians vehemently denied that Denmark had abandoned its neighbors to join 
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80  This “bridge” argument has been used, often quite effectively, to silence 
critics of integration. 
With the United Kingdom, Denmark was one of the two long-standing members 
states for which European integration would not build a greater state identity, and as 
such, is reluctant to move forward with political integration.
81  Few other European 
countries have the same degree of public involvement, through referenda or public 
debates, as does Denmark.  A convention has existed in Denmark since 1972 that 
referenda should be posed to the electorate when matters arise that involve major changes 
in the country’s relationship with Europe; the Maastricht problems strongly reinforced 
this trend.
82   
Danish peasants assumed leadership in the nineteenth century, aided by the small 
size of the state after its 1864 defeat.  Without the need to ‘nationalize’ the peasantry, a 
culture of consensus developed.  This “peculiarity of the Danes” is a large part of why 
many feel deep-rooted national values will fall away when challenged by European 
integration.
83  The population of Denmark is “unusually homogenous,” with only 
“negligible” ethnic minorities.
84  The “pure nation-state” hypothesis put forward says that 
sovereignty will only reluctantly be given up, because the existing system has the broad 
support of the people.
85  Immigrants in Denmark comprise roughly four percent of the 
population.  A large proportion of these immigrants does not follow the “unspoken 
Danish way of life” and challenge it “in ways never experienced before.”
86
National identity in Denmark fluctuates between that belonging to a “small state 
with a moral right to exercise influence because of its strong and coherent society and 
that of a small state with no influence of the world.”
87  A small state is defined as “one 
which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, 
and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or 
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  24developments to do so.”
88  Danes see themselves as both part of a weak country as well 
as a country with great international influence in some areas and morally, high 
standards.
89  Most small member states welcome the EU as a protection from larger states 
who may otherwise overpower them or not honor agreements.  Especially when 
compared to, for example, the Benelux states, as an older and economically advanced 
state, the Danes are far more skeptical about integration.
90
As outlined, for Denmark, integration never filled a “psychological need for a 
state identity.”
91  Their legacy as a country of equals fits with a land which has not 
known the immigration of other European states and one which does not want outsiders 
or the supranational EU bodies treading on all it holds dear.  The cleavages which exist 
now are along the supranational and intergovernmental lines.  It is possible that the 
Danes, over time, will continue to realize the importance of allowing supranational 
intervention in their country and may shift additional identification to the European level.  
Based on current trends, however, that does not seem likely.  The role in which Denmark 
finds itself could be a good fit – not a fully engaged member state, yet not as ‘outcast’ as 
the United Kingdom – and identification levels could remain among the lowest in 
Europe. 
 
Case Study: France 
The levels of identification with Europe in France are moderately high, which 
seems unlikely given some of the past conflicts between French politicians and the EU.  
The insistence on retaining intergovernmental cooperation led to the famous Empty Chair 
Crisis under Charles de Gaulle, for example.  Paradoxically, the attacks on French 
sovereignty and identity – both from the EU as well as from immigration – have caused 
the French to look to Europe for determining what their identity will be in the “new 
France”.  It is likely that identifying with Europe helps the French to reassert their 
                                                 
88 Østergaard 141 
89 Østergaard 140 
90 Branner and Kelstrup 15 
91 Laffan 87 
  25Frenchness in a way consistent with “old France,” even as Euroskepticism becomes more 
prevalent.
92
In France, a “discourse on Europe is always a discourse on France, and the French 
quest for the meaning of Europe may be identified with the French quest for the meaning 
of France.”
93  After the French Revolution in 1789, the French felt their mission was to 
spread their brand of civilization to the world.  Europe gave France an outlet to develop 
and spread both its cultural influences and military might.
  94  The reality in France is 
quite different from, and not entirely compatible with, the collective memory and what 
many argue France should be again: a state with a thriving peasantry, no immigration, a 
protected economy and a shelter from Americanization, to name some developments.  
After the period of de Gaulle, the French suddenly found themselves in an unfamiliar 
position, one in which they could not be sure of holding on to their European influence.
95  
Modern French identity involves questioning about “the France we have lost” and asks, 
“is France still France?”  The breaks from past traditions have resulted in this line of 
inquiry, remarkable in and of itself, regardless of the actual answer.
96
The end of the Cold War and reuniting of Europe caused France to admit it 
depends on its neighbors for economic and security status.
97  The collapse of the post-war 
structure removed a large part of what it had meant to be French.  The Fifth Republic 
notions of Independence and Grandeur were part of the sentiment that France had a 
special mission.
98  Any proposals which threatened these ideals were quickly negated; it 
was “easier to live the fiction than debate the reality.”
99
Unlike the other two large states in the Original Six, France aspired to 
supranational cooperation while keeping its strong national identity, while Germany and 
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  26Italy were more willing to make their identities part of the supranational institutions.
100  
The French wanted to retain their power in Europe and protect against a German 
resurgence.  The “certain pedigree and legitimacy” of French Euroskepticism hails from 
its association with Charles de Gaulle and his stature in contemporary French politics.
101  
De Gaulle gave content to a deeper, long-standing French mythology of France as an 
autonomous state which was not subject to the same rules as its partners in NATO and 
the EEC, an acceptable role for one of the formerly great European powers.
102
  French Euroskepticism is today found in, among other parties, the RPR and more 
famously, the Front National.  The RPR views Europe as a core threat to national 
sovereignty and the desire to promote French national solidarity.
103  The Front Nationale 
leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, called Maastricht “the end of France, the French people, its 
language and its culture.”
104  Euroskeptics on the left of the French political spectrum do 
not focus on the threat to national identity, instead citing social policy being sacrificed for 
economics and the lack of popular involvement in European decision-making.
105
Net immigration since the post-war period total about five million individuals and 
accounts for roughly one-third of the French growth in population during these years.
106  
Non-European immigrants, usually living in highly visible concentrations, have not 
assimilated into French society as readily as did previous waves of immigrants from 
inside Europe.  The arrival of the FN has caused the other parties to respond to its claims 
about sovereignty and national identity, though its importance is larger than this.  It not 
only explains the form of the present-day hostilities around nation- and statehood but is 
also a symptom of these tensions.
107
By the mid-1990s, the ever-changing internal and external politics “heightened 
France’s sense of navigating without a rudder.”
108  While they supported European 
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  27integration, they did not want it to conflict with reestablishing what it means to “be 
French.”  By using Europe to find France’s place in the system, the citizenry hopes to 
solve their immigration and sovereignty issues.  It is for this reason that European 
identification can actually help identification with France, as it has done in decades past. 
 
Case Study: Spain 
Spain spent nearly forty years under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco.  
The last Spanish involvement in European affairs before the transition to democracy 
dates back to the Napoleonic Wars, after its neutrality in the two World Wars and 
isolation under Franco.  After his death, the almost unanimous top priority according to 
both the elite and the public was to “rejoin” Europe.  This fact, combined with the 
support for Europe from the Spanish regions, the lack of an internal “Other” and the 
struggling Spanish economy, leads to the higher-than-average levels of identification 
with Europe on the part of Spanish citizens.  Enthusiasm for Europe is common among 
supporters of the Madrid government as well as the regionalists and nationalists, though 
for very different reasons, as is explored below.   
Despite becoming a member of the United Nations in 1955, the authoritarian 
nature of the Spanish state prevented entry into the European Economic Community and 
caused those who rejected Francoism to ally themselves with a new idea of “Europe,” 
that which included democracy and a modernization of their country.
109 “Entering 
Europe” represented Spain’s ticket to leave behind el atraso – ‘the backwardness’ – of 
her past and become a respected member of the West. More than simply a way to 
modernization, Europe was a guarantee against internal separatist and extremist threats.  
Europe appeared, and still appears, to the Spanish as a provider of peace and security and 
a way to go beyond internal divisions.
110  Spain is the only EU member state, excluding 
the Original Six, whose political parties were entirely in agreement about membership, 
including the Communist Party. 
Integration was also a crutch for Portugal and Greece, both of whom emerged 
from dictatorial regimes in the 1970s, as did Spain, which dated back to the post-war era.  
All three countries lagged behind the ‘core’ of Europe in their socio-economic 
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  28development and hoped Europe would solve their domestic problems.
111  While the three 
countries’ entries into the EC were similar, only in Spain did the goal of membership 
have enthusiastic support from all major actors.  Its neighbor, Portugal, had not been as 
excluded as Spain as a result of its membership – under Salazar – in both NATO and the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and did not have all hopes for a “return” rested 
upon the EC.
112
Spain is neither a unitary or a federal state, but a hybrid of both; like France, 
Spain is a multinational state which involves non-Spanish nations but does not recognize 
them as such.
113  The 1978 Spanish constitution invented the idea of “autonomous 
communities,” instead of “regions” or “nations.”  It is based on “the indissoluble unity of 
the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards, and it 
recognize and guarantees the right of autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which 
it is composed, and the solidarity among all of them.”
114  In contrast to the federal 
systems of Austria, Belgium and Germany, there is no constitutional provision for ACs to 
participate in foreign affairs, which includes European Union affairs, more 
specifically.
115  Democracy and decentralization have not been enough to satisfy 
regionalist factions in Catalonia, Galacia and the Basque Country, for whom the EU 
represents a chance to circumvent the central government and ultimately achieve their 
independence.
116  Regions may see the EU either as a source of problems or as something 
that ameliorates their problems.  These disparities may be a result of the varied 
responsibilities and powers of the autonomous communities.
117
These regional differences are of a linguistic nature and, historically, Spain has 
long been a fairly homogenous state.  The entire country now faces immigration, mostly 
from the Mahgreb area, which is small in overall numbers and heavily concentrated, but 
has provoked racial discrimination.
118  All significant political minorities in Spain have 
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  29been linguistically defined, not racially or ethnically.
119  These new “outsiders” could 
weaken area nationalisms and contribute to an increased feeling of “Spanishness,” 
perhaps with the aid of Europe.  The recent immigration phenomenon is too new and still 
not significant enough to be an internal other.
120  Thus, Europe remains Spain’s “Other” 
– the mark against which it compared itself. 
Some argue that the EU has actually helped to establish a Spanish national 
identity.  Integration is seen as “part of their national project, rather than as a project with 
its own specific purpose,” and Europe is a source of identification for Spaniards, though 
largely through its role as a basis for Spanish national identity.
121  Spain has received a 
number of benefits from the EU, which certainly have inspired an identification with 
Europe.  At the time of its accession, Spain’s per capita GDP was just over two-thirds of 
the EU average.  Unemployment and inflation rates were more than twice the European 
average.
122  Spanish elites argued that monetary union would be beneficial because it 
would bring stability, lower inflation, greater competitiveness and more economic growth 
and international prestige.  By 1999, almost three percent of national GDP came from 
Cohesion and Structural Fund transfers.
123
Unfortunately for European elites, Spain faced a number of challenges in the 
1990s which threatened to undermine its position in Europe, and as a result, its European 
identity at the expense of nationalist rhetoric embraced by the government.  As the 
European Economic and Monetary Union gathered steam, Spain looked as if it would not 
make the requirements for participation.  The impending Central and Eastern European 
enlargement would necessitate an internal restructuring of the EU through which Spain 
would have its relative power reduced.  Further, sluggish international markets led not 
only to economic problems domestically, but also EU budget cutbacks and an insistence 
upon meeting the criteria before joining EMU.
124  The defense of national interests 
became a high priority and the unquestioning acceptance of Europe was in the past. 
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  30The previously unquestioned and unflagging support for Europe has diminished 
over time.  The Francoist era has begun to fade into a forgotten past and the excitement of 
participating in European summits has dwindled.  It is possible to argue that Spain 
wanted to be European more so that its citizens would avoid being left outside than 
because they wanted to be a part of a European identity.
125  Despite the difficulties, the 
degree of compatibility between European and Spanish identification is much greater 
than the EU average.
126  A feeling of both nationalism and Europeanness is usually found 
about ten percent above the European average, while exclusive Spanish identity is about 
five to ten percent below average.
127  These levels could decrease over the next few 
years, as the current administration employs more Euro-skeptic policies and continued 
enlargement diverts resources away from the Iberian Peninsula and toward the Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe. 
 
Trends across Europe 
There is a clear divide between north and south in Europe in terms of how they 
perceive Europe and their ties to it, according to studies conducted by the European 
Commission.  The large south – states geographically in the south, center or east of the 
continent – sees Europe historically and as a place of culture that has produced diverse 
people with common roots.  This culture is particularly enticing for the Latin countries, 
Belgium and Luxembourg.
128  These states, over time, have belonged to empires, like the 
Habsburg, Byzantine and Holy Roman, in which they mixed with dissimilar people.  The 
northern countries – Scandinavia, the British Isles, and Germany – do not feel the same 
pull or desire to be part of a European culture.  The study shows that over the past two 
decades, this split between north and south has widened.
129
The citizens of small states may be more aware of their government’s somewhat 
limited ability to ensure protection, strong economic performance and a welfare system.  
To this end, they are thought to be more likely to both identify with the EU that can 
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  31supplement these roles and, following from this, accept the legitimacy of the EU.
130  
Additionally, small states gain a protection from larger states in decision-making, 
because they are given a proportionately larger share of voting rights.  While all of this 
may explain high levels of identification with Europe in the Benelux countries and 
Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, with their small populations, are examples of small 
states with a prevailing skeptical attitude toward Europe, possibly because of their 
“intimacy as political arenas.”
131  A citizenry’s perception of their country as a core or 
periphery member state is also likely to affect how greatly it identifies with Europe.  The 
variables of being core or periphery are geographic, in terms of distance from Brussels, as 
well as their history and length of membership, by which account the Benelux countries 
and Ireland are more central and the Nordic countries more peripheral. 
A European identity may be stronger in member states with greater internal 
divisions, be they in minority communities or as a result of “imperfect state formation,” 
where the state “has not succeeded in capturing all sentiments of political loyalty for the 
nation.”
132  For example, Belgium is one of the most internally divided countries, with 
the Flanders and Wallonia communities each taking about half the population, and has 
one of the highest identification levels.  Feelings of Europeanness are also typically 
higher in those regions and communities than the national average. 
In times when a state is perceived to have failed to protect its citizens, 
identification with Europe may increase.  The largest example of this is in times of war; 
there is a strong correlation between conflict and support for integration in the twentieth 
century.
133  Hooghe and Marks say that “organized coercion – above all, war and colonial 
domination” has done more to shape attachments to territory than anything else.
134  In 
wartime situations, a strong “us” versus “them” national mentality takes hold and 
triumphs supra- and sub-national identities.  In times of peace, this “immensely powerful 
influence toward exclusive identity” is absent, allowing for greater multiple identities; in 
this case, European identity.
135
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The EU and Steps Toward Common Identity 
Romano Prodi recently said that an identity for Europe is necessary, as the goal of 
the elite is to build a “true political Union.”
136  European officials have long struggled 
with a solution for turning ordinary peoples of Europe into Europeans.  The problem, in 
their minds, is that “action is needed in the cultural sector to make people more aware of 
their European identity” and that it is necessary to “[stimulate] public interest in the 
European venture” to obtain the “direct involvement of the people in their own 
destiny.”
137  During the time of the ECSC and EEC, the projects were technocratic and 
elite-driven.  The public had little interest in this idea of Europe and did not truly 
question the legitimacy of the decisions made, hence the existence of what is called a 
“permissive consensus.”  Many elites feel that a technocratic European Union is not a 
problem; just as, for example, bureaucrats transformed “peasants into Frenchmen” under 
Napoleon, the European bureaucrats hope to transform “peasants” into “Europeans,” a 
process they believe starts among themselves.
138
After the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Walter Hallstein said, “we are not 
integrating economies, we are integrating politics.  We are not just sharing our furniture, 
we are buying a new and bigger house.”
139  The obstacles to freedom of movement of 
people were removed from that point until the early 1970s, with, as one example, family 
members of workers gaining entry and residence rights.  The Paris Summit of October 
1972 introduced an “ambitious program to establish a political union,” and the following 
year’s Copenhagen Summit produced a “Declaration on European Identity,” which set 
out for the first time, “principles for the internal development of the Community, thereby 
furnishing a framework for the formation of a political conception of European 
identity.”
140  However, this conception involved much Euro-rhetoric and did little to 
formally define “European identity.”  In December 1974, policy objectives for identity 
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  33gave the 1973 Declaration more substance.  Members of the EP were to be directly and 
universally elected and special rights would be bestowed upon citizens of the member 
states.  The Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, was asked to draft a report detailing 
the measures required for the “creation of a Europe of citizens,” though the Hague 
Summit reviewed the Tindemans report without any positive decisions.
141
  The passport union was created around this time, under which citizens of member 
states would carry uniform passports and rules about border control and alien rights were 
harmonized.  This was one of the many symbolic measures undertaken in an effort to 
inspire the public to feel more European; the idea was that holding identical passports 
would create a common bond, though most people did not feel more like a member of a 
European community.
142  Typically, by using symbols like currency, anthems, 
ceremonies and flags, members of a group are “reminded of their common heritage and 
cultural kinship and feel strengthened and exalted by their sense of common identity and 
belonging.”
143
The mandate of the second report of the Adonnino Committee, established by the 
Fontainebleau Council in 1985, was to “propose measures which would tend to reinforce 
the identity and image of the community in such a way as to make these conform more 
closely to citizens’ expectations.”
144  This report included propositions for identity-
building and symbol-creation: a “comprehensive European inter-university program of 
exchanges” and asking member states to recognize of academic credentials of other 
states; the use of the circle of twelve gold stars on a blue background as both a 
Community emblem and flag; the playing of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” from the Ninth 
Symphony at European events; the issuing of postage stamps to commemorate important 
European Community events; and the redesigning of signs at borders to reflect the 
openness of the single market.
145   
The adoption of the Schengen Agreements in 1985 by France, Germany, and the 
Benelux countries established a framework for the gradual removal of internal border 
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  34restrictions between signatory countries.  It would, ten years later, be enshrined of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.  The Single European Act of 1986 marked a turning point at which 
the European bodies “while remaining unaccountable to a European popular assembly, 
began producing a growing number of regulations, and the issue of legitimacy was 
raised.”
146  The Treaty on European Union showed a “realization that identification 
couldn’t be ordained, but had to be achieved through political and economic reforms and 
by fostering a new universalist ethos which would help transform the active economic 
actors’ rights into citizens’ rights.”
147  The problem surrounding the ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union was the first true conflict between nationalism and European 
identity. 
Symbols are how ideas like “nation,” “citizenship” and “Europe” become tangible 
and understandable.
148  These invented traditions try to “inculcate certain values and 
norms of behavior by implying continuity with the past,” now that European elites realize 
that a supranational identity will not occur on its own as a byproduct of integration.
149  
Though many treaties reference this European identity, none formally define it.  A 
definition is a difficult task, as a too-narrow definition “risks excluding foreign goods, 
immigrants and entire countries,” while a too-wide definition “may dilute the very values 




The importance of having a European identity, whatever it may be, is apparent.  
The effects of identity are far-reaching, and can affect already-integrated sectors of 
Europe.  Making the public more connected to Europe and to the EU is all but impossible 
without a “European people,” which differs greatly from “citizens in Europe”.  The 
“constitutional process and the constitutional rhetoric inherent in the work of the 
Convention have been closely related to an attempt to express a European identity,” as 
constitutions are “also expressions of the moral and political identity of the demoi they 
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  35seek to define.”
151  This lack of demos, according to some, is the reason for the cited lack 
of democracy in the EU, for “the democratic system without ‘demos’ is just ‘cratos,’ or 
power.”
152  A demos certainly does not need to be an ethnos, but unless the members of 
the demos recognize each other as such, a common identity can not form.  Bruter asks if 
it is “fair to create a European ‘citizenship’ and a fully institutionalized European 
political system if citizens do not ‘feel’ European yet,” and certainly, there are many who 
would say it is unfair to do so.
153
Prodi said that, “European identity is inextricably linked to a new type of 
citizenship based on multiple forms of allegiance, ranging from the local town to the 
Union. The single national identity would be replaced by complementary identities.”
154  
However, because “nobody can become European without first acquiring a national 
identity… the new form of European citizenship and identity does not really transcend 
national identities, it is currently completely dependent on national identity.”
155  As a 
result, it is possible that the groups excluded from European national citizenships, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, will turn to Europe for support and identify more strongly 
with Europe.  This is seen already to an extent with the minority groups, discussed above.  
It is possible that a European identity will arise and overcome these obstacles, but it is 
also possible – and perhaps, likely – that the construction of a European identity will 
remain reliant upon, and largely secondary to, national identity.  From the founding 
fathers through today’s leaders, the idea of an overarching European identity has 
remained ever-present. 
European countries are increasingly defined as members of the EU, non-members 
of the EU, or aspiring members of the EU; this affects their position within Europe, and 
to some extent, internationally, as the EU becomes impossible to ignore or overlook.  
Using “Europe” and “the EU” interchangeably, as many in Europe already do, that means 
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  36the EU has “successfully occupied the social space of what it means to be European.  One 
could then not be a ‘real’ European without being an EU member.”
156  The uncertain 
identity of Europe is reflected in the discussions over the countries that should or should 
not be part of Europe.  No one would argue that Switzerland and Norway are not part of 
Europe, yet both of their publics have refused membership when asked.  On the other 
hand, countries like Turkey are passionately committed to joining the EU, though their 
cultural and geographical ties to Europe are questionable.
157  Even the 2004 Eastern 
enlargement has not rectified the fact that the borders of the EU do not line up with the 
“borders of a European culture and civilization.”
158
There are two methods by which some form of supranational European identity 
may form, without any suppression of diversity or invention of new myths.  The first is 
by the promotion of trans-European political parties, which would in turn promote policy 
at the European level and relay developments directly to constituents, cutting out the 
national-level ‘middleman.’  The situation today is that parties in the European 
Parliament act “predominantly or almost exclusively” as “actors of their respective 
national party systems.”
159  These parties should be the most important political 
advocates of integration, but they have little legitimacy or power of their own.  If political 
parties would shift parts of their loyalty to the European level, integration could become 
more appealing to the citizens and increase European identification.
160
The second method is by creating a trans-European broadcast media.  The 
broadcast media, by virtue of mode of operation, provide the public with symbolic 
messages, rather than expanding and expanding on information.  Studies have shown that 
mass media exposure can influence the political party identification of individuals, which 
“makes it possible to claim that not only behavior but also attitudes are influenced by 
media messages, and suggest that perhaps, deeper identities may be influenced by 
political communication as well.”
161  While this may be, in theory, an excellent way to 
disseminate and promote a European identity, it will, in practice, not work for several 
                                                 
156 Risse, “European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?” 255 
157 Decker, Frank, “Governance beyond the nation-state: Reflections on the democratic deficit of the 
European Union,” (Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 9, Number 2, April 2002) 264 
158 Bruter, Citizens of Europe?  The Emergence of a Mass European Identity 7 
159 Papcke, Sven, “Who Needs European Identity and What Could it Be?” (Nelson, Roberts and Veit) 82 
160 Papcke 85-92 
161 Bruter, Citizens of Europe?  The Emergence of a Mass European Identity 28-29 
  37reasons.  First, there is no assurance that the public will interpret the media messages in 
the intended manner.  Second, the media are centered around regions and nations; 
genuine trans-European media do not yet exist.
162  Third, as most actors in European 
news represent the country in which the news is broadcast, the stories are presented with 
a national slant.  However, citizens in Europe continue to identify television news as their 
most important way of learning about European issues.
163
The creation of a common European myth is complex and will remain so.  Both 
top-down and bottom-up initiatives are necessary to construct a European identity.  It is 
clear that neofunctionalist theory has its limits, and that spillover into cultural arenas does 
not happen as readily as originally thought.  Despite the potential difficulties, European 
policymakers must push forward to foster the feeling of Europeanness so that integration 
into new sectors is possible.  Based on the research above, it appears that much of the 
push needs to occur at the national level, as the factors outside of the EU’s control have 
been shown to be, on the whole, more significant than those which the EU does control.  
If European elites understand which variables have the most significant effect on 
identification with Europe, they can use the information to better foster the European idea 
and identity, though it may be civic rather than cultural in nature.  European identification 
may remain an elite affair, as they are often in better positions to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by integration, opportunities seen as a threat to some of the 
public.
164  The problem remains that elite identification without mass identification is not 
enough to push the European ideal through the twenty-first century. 
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